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Abstract—Anyone can publish various kinds of information
on the Internet almost freely, but in some cases such information
distribution is inhibited by the authorities. In order to resist
such censorship, there have been developed many anonymous
information distribution systems such as Freenet and Tor, but
some people argue that such a system may also be a hotbed of
crime since scrupulous anonymity disturbs investigations. In this
paper, an article distribution system is proposed, which protects
pseudonymity of users from surveillance by the authorities as with
existing anticensorship systems. As a novel point, the proposed
system allows a user to trace the publisher of an article by
cooperation of the users who have relayed the article. This will
suppress criminal acts abusing pseudonymity in the system. On
the other hand, it is dicult to trace the publisher for a single
government or an organization alone unless it obtains cooperation
of multiple users. The proposed system will therefore be able to
avoid authoritarian censorship or surveillance by the authorities.
The system adopts P2P architecture, and a user can publish
articles to other users like Netnews. A published article is relayed
by node to node and spreads over the network of the system. In
order to trace the publisher of an article, a user records a relaying
log when he relays an article. A relaying log contains information
about the predecessor from whom the user received the article. A
user can trace the publisher by gathering relaying logs. Each user
has responsibility to determine whether to disclose a relaying log
or not, considering the content of the article. If all users along
the path from the publisher agree to cooperate in gathering their
logs, they will be able to trace to the publisher. The performance
of the system is discussed in evaluation, how users’ actions aect
traceability, and what should users do if governments intervene
in the system.
Keywords—peer-to-peer; censorship; privacy; traceable; infor-
mation distribution;
I. Introduction
The Internet has become a worldwide communication
infrastructure where you can publish various kinds of infor-
mation to an unspecified large number of people and can
also access such published information at any time. However,
there are some cases in which such activities are inhibited
by the authorities. For example, a government may block
access to unfavorable information or may punish people who
published criticisms of the government. Such actions are called
Internet censorship and are continuously reported as “Enemies
of the Internet” [1] by the Reporters Without Borders [2]. In
2013, Edward Joseph Snowden, a former sta of the National
Security Agency (NSA) of the USA, leaked information about
the PRISM program of the NSA, which conducts surveillance
of Internet communication and collection of personal informa-
tion [3]. It is widely discussed about such collecting personal
information and invasion of privacy by governments.
There are many researches on protecting the freedom of
expression and the privacy of users from Internet censorship or
surveillance. Freenet [4] and Tor [5] are typical representatives.
Using these technologies, one can distribute information with
high anonymity, avoiding Internet censorship.
However, can it be said that Internet censorship or surveil-
lance is always evil and should be eliminated? There is a
dicult problem in it (Figure 1). If a criminal declaration is
published on the Internet, most people will desire to trace the
publisher and to prevent it. On the other hand, if a criticism of a
government is published, someone who goes along with it may
wish it would widely spread. Considering these examples, we
suppose that Internet censorship or surveillance are regarded as
evil when they are conducted nevertheless many people dissent
from it.
In this paper, we propose an information distribution
system which is not aected by authoritarian censorship or
surveillance by a single subject such as a government or a
company. The system is designed as a standard article distri-
bution system like Netnews [6] and allows users to publish
articles pseudonymously. The proposed system allows a user
to trace the distribution path of an article in specific cases. It
is a clue for detecting the publisher of the article. The trace
needs cooperation of all users who have relayed the article. The
system constructs a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network and spreads
published articles by relaying between peers. When a peer
relays an article, it records a relaying log in its local storage so
that a user can trace the distribution path later. If all users along
the path from the publisher agree to cooperate in gathering
their logs, they will be able to trace to the publisher.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter II
describes related work and the dierence from it. Chapter III
shows the design of the system. Chapter IV discusses the
evaluation of the system. Chapter V concludes this paper and
mentions future work.
II. RelatedWork
A. P2P Information Distribution
There are some researches on defending the privacy of
users and the freedom of expression. They allow users to




The freedom of expression, …
Criminal investigation,
Prevention of terrorism, …
The Internet
Fig. 1. The problem on the Internet which this paper focuses. Which should
be prioritized, the privacy of users or criminal investigation?
a distributed system, which has no Single Point of Failure
(SPOF). In addition, the case of the NSA indicates that if a
system is operated by a specific organization, a government
can conduct surveillance by intervening in it. These systems
are not operated by a specific administrator.
Freenet [4] is software by which a user can share files,
browse, and publish Web pages anonymously. It is developed
to defend the freedom of expression on the Internet. Devices
running Freenet construct an overlay network and share their
machine resource to provide functions of Freenet. Communi-
cation in Freenet is anonymized with encryption and multiple
proxies, so that nobody can find who accesses what content.
Tor [5] provides anonymous communication by Onion
Routing. Onion Routing ensures anonymity by using multiple
proxies and encrypting communications multiple times. The
network of Tor proxies does not stop even if some of the prox-
ies go down. There are researches on anonymous information
distribution using Tor [7], [8].
Some other researches also proposed anonymous commu-
nication or information distribution [9], [10], but they entirely
pursue anonymity to defend privacy or rights such as the
freedom of expression and the right to know. Although our
proposed system also aims to protect them, it allows to trace
the publisher of an article in specific cases.
Netnews [6], a traditional information distribution system,
constructs a P2P network of news servers deployed by users.
The proposed system also constructs a P2P network, and
published articles are relayed by node to node like Netnews.
However, Netnews does not consider anonymity of users.
An article in Netnews contains the Path header field, which
indicates the route on which the article is relayed since it had
published [11]. The route is a clue to trace the publisher of the
article. Our proposed system allows a user to publish an article
with hiding information about the publisher of the article.
B. Public Key Infrastructure for Distributed Systems
Our proposed system requires users to have their certifi-
cates. However, the system does not use Certificate Authority
(CA) to retrieve certificates since it could be an SPOF. Some
researches proposed how to construct Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) as a distributed system.
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), which is used in email en-
cryption and digital signature adopts Web of Trust (WoT) for
PKI [12]. In WoT, if you trust a user, you can trust other users
who the user trusts as well. Figure 2 shows an example of a





Fig. 2. A network of Web of Trust (WoT).
nodes at both sides of it trust each other. For example, node
Na can trust node Nh through node Nb and node Ne. A user
can trust other users indirectly by WoT even if there is not
direct trust relationship.
There have been some researches on distributed PKI for on-
line publishing certificates. Chord-PKI [13] proposed a method
for publishing and managing certificates using Chord [14],
which is an implementation of Distributed Hash Table (DHT).
In a Chord-PKI system, a system administrator deploys some
trusted nodes which publish certificates into the P2P network.
The trusted nodes publish certificates on demand by other un-
trusted nodes. Published certificates and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) are managed with Chord. There are some other
researches about building distributed PKI [15]. They aim to
build scalable distributed PKI in P2P networks.
Our proposed system should not be operated by a specific
administrator, and hence the system adopts PGP WoT for
publishing certificates.
III. The Design of the System
The proposed system is an article distribution system like
Netnews. It provides only the following simple two functions
for publishing articles to a user.
1) Publishing articles to other users
2) Reading articles published by other users
The goal of the proposed system is to protect the privacy
of users from censorship and surveillance, while the system
allows a user to trace the publisher of an article as well.
The requirements for the proposed system are defined as
(1) availability, (2) pseudonymity, and (3) traceability. In
addition, the proposed system provides a method to detect
impersonation described as (4) impersonation-proofness. The
rest of this chapter explains them.
A. Availability
When unfavorable information for a government is pub-
lished, the government may attack to stop the system or block
access to the system so as to suppress the spread of the
information. The proposed system adopts P2P architecture,
so as not to contain any SPOF, attack to which might cause
system down. In addition, if a system were operated by a
specific organization, a government could conduct surveillance
by intervening in it. The proposed system does not require a
specific administrator.
Figure 3 shows the overview of the system. The system
constructs a P2P network of users’ terminals. A user can
Publisher
article article
Fig. 3. The overview of the proposed system.
deploy a node to the network and publish or retrieve articles
through the node. A published article is relayed by node to
node and spreads through the network. In this architecture, if
each node connects to multiple nodes, a published article will
spread through the network even though some nodes stop. The
system therefore has higher availability than a system based
on client-server architecture with respect to not containing any
SPOF. Additionally, the network is composed of terminals of
users, and no specific administrator is needed. This means that
the system does not have the same problem as the surveillance
of the NSA mentioned in I.
If some nodes in the network are attacked and are made
to stop, the network may become partially disconnected.
However, a node can relay articles to other connected nodes
as long as they are alive even when some parts of the network
are disconnected. The network of the system therefore does
not always required to be a fully connected one.
A node peers with another trustworthy node. As mentioned
in Section II-B, each node has their own certificates. A node
can determine whether it can trust another node or not by
verifying its certificate. If a node can trust the certificate of
another node, it can peer with the node. The proposed system
adopts PGP WoT for PKI. Trustiness of a certificate can be
examined with searching the WoT network.
B. Pseudonymity
A user in the system can publish articles pseudonymously.
Pseudonymity is a concept dierent from anonymity. General
meaning of anonymity and pseudonymity in terms of informa-
tion distribution is described as follows.
Anonymity
A user can publish information, hiding his identity.
Pseudonymity
A user can publish information using an alternative
identifier, hiding the real identity. It can be inter-
preted that you can detect the user’s identity by
gathering some pieces of information.
In this paper, the term “pseudonymous” means that a user
can publish an article with hiding his identity but other users
can detect the identity of the publisher of the article by
gathering some pieces of information. This section explains
how a user publishes an article with hiding his identity.
A node which has received an article relays it to its
neighbor nodes. Figure 4 shows how an article is published
and relayed to neighbor nodes.
In the figure, a user publishes an article through his node
Nx. In this paper a node which receives an article from its









Fig. 4. How a user publishes an article with hiding his identity.
article from another node is called a relay node. Nx relays the
article to node Ny as if Nx were a relay node, so that other
nodes including Ny cannot find the distribution path of the
article. An article does not contain any information about who
published it. This means that the user has published the article
with hiding his identity. Thus the proposed system enables
pseudonymous publishing by multiple relaying.
C. Traceability
The previous section has described how a user publishes
articles with hiding his identity. This section discusses how
a user traces the initial node of an article by gathering some
pieces of information. An initial node receives an article from
the publisher of it, and in many cases the node is deployed by
the publisher himself. Tracing an initial node can be a clue to
trace the publisher.
Users in the system are supposed to have their own
certificates. As discussed in Section II-B, the proposed system
adopts PGP WoT for PKI, which does not require a specific
administrator. A user can find information contained in a
PGP certificate by tracing WoT. A PGP certificate generally
contains the name, email addresses, etc., of the owner. The
authenticity of these information relies on processes of signing
certificates. In the common use case of PGP, users sign each
other’s certificates with face-to-face communication. Some
certificates might be associated with information about a fake
owner, but association can be more reliable by using some
formal documents such as a driver’s license which contains
the owner’s name and a face shot. The proposed system uses
PGP certificates since they are already used by many users.
It is important that users easily join in the system. If a fake
certificate having a signature of another user is found while
tracing process, the trace stops at the user who signed the
certificate.
The rest of this section explains how a user traces the initial
node of an article. In the system, a user records a relaying log
in his local storage when he relays an article from a neighbor
node.
The format of a relaying log is as follows.
log B (sender id; article id; previous log hash;
signature)
sender id
The id of the node from which a node received an
article.
article id
The id of an article explained in Section III-D.
previous log hash
The hash value of the log stored in the source
node of relaying which was recorded when the node










Fig. 6. How the source node of
relaying (Nx) signs the destination
node’s (Ny) relaying log.
the source node of relaying does not have a relaying
log for some reasons (in many cases, it is the initial
node of the article), this value can be a random
value. This value is passed from the source node.
signature
A signature of the relaying log. This is added by the
source node of relaying.
If each node records a relaying log for each relaying,
a user can trace the initial node of an article by gathering
logs. Now suppose all relaying logs about an article are gath-
ered from each node. Each relaying log contains information
about from whom a node received the article (sender id)
and the hash value of the log which the node whose id
is the sender id has (previous log hash), so a tree like
Figure 5 can be constructed by joining the information. The
P2P network on which articles are relayed generally has cycles
like Figure 3, but joining relaying logs generates a tree owing
to previous log hash. The root of the tree is the initial node
of an article, so a user can trace the initial node if he gathers
all relaying logs about the article.
However, a user can easily tamper with logs since they
are stored at local storage, or can show fake logs in order to
pretend that he relayed the article. To address this problem, the
source node of relay signs a relaying log which the destination
node records. The key used for signing relaying logs is the
secret key which corresponds to the certificate of the source
node. It means that the destination node outputs a relaying log
and the source node signs the log for each relaying (Figure 6).
After the source node signs, the destination node stores it at
local storage.
A user can examine whether a node is the initial node of
an article or not with a relaying log which the node has. If the
node can show a relaying log about the article, it is not the
initial node but a relay node. Conversely, if it cannot show a
log, it is the initial node. If it did not receive the article from
the publisher and just relayed from another node, it should have
a relaying log signed by the node from which it has received
the article. An initial node cannot obtain such relaying logs.
If a node cannot show a signed relaying log about an article,
it is regarded as the initial node of the article nevertheless it
just have relayed the article from another node. This means
that a relay node which cannot show its relaying log may be
regarded as an initial node. A node must not relay an article
if the node from which it received the article does not sign its
relaying log.
A user can trace the initial node of an article by gathering
relaying logs. If all users along the path from the initial node
show their relaying logs, the user can trace the node. Each
user determines whether to show his log or not considering he
wants to trace the initial node. If he wants to trace the node,
he should show his relaying log. If he does not want to, he
should not. If some of the users hide their logs, the user cannot
trace the initial node.
D. Impersonation-Proofness
Users in the system publish articles pseudonymously, and
hence a malicious user can publish articles impersonating
another user. This is not a main issue this paper focuses, but
such impersonation confuses other users. The system allows
a user to attach a proof that the publisher of an article is the
same one of another article which the user has published (but
other users cannot find who is the publisher) to an article.
The format of an article is as follows.
article B (article id; body; publickey; signature)
article id
The article’s id. This is defined as the hash value
of body and publickey, so this value changes if
even one of them is modified and the article will
be regarded as dierent one.
body
The body of an article.
publickey
An public key generated by the publisher. This is
a dierent key from the public key used for the
certificate of the publisher. The owner’s information
is not associated with the key unlike certificates,
so other users cannot obtain information about the
publisher from publickey.
signature
The encrypted value of article id with the secret
key corresponding to publickey.
A user generates a pair of a secret key and a public
key to construct articles. It has been explained that a user
has a certificate and signs relaying logs with the secret key
corresponding to the certificate, but the key pair used to
construct articles is dierent one from them. It means that
a user has two key pairs for dierent purposes. Note that no
information about the key owner is associated with the key
pair used for articles.
If a user uses a single key pair for multiple articles, other
users can verify the articles are published by the same user.
When a user obtains two articles, the user can examine that by
verifying the signature of one with the publickey of another. If
the verification succeeds, the user can be convinced that they
are published by the same user. Users in the system thus detect
impersonation using public key cryptography.
IV. Evaluation
This chapter discusses several features of the proposed
system.
A. Traceability
The proposed system introduces a method for tracing the
initial node of an article by cooperation of users. Cooperation





Fig. 7. A tree constructed by gathering relaying logs.
the initial node. The more users show relaying logs, the easier
they trace the initial node. In order to evaluate how users’
actions aect traceability, suppose that a user can take one of
the following three kinds of actions about showing relaying
logs.
1) Not show a relaying log: a user does not want to
trace the initial node
2) Not show a relaying log until traced to him: a user
does not positively want to trace the initial node but
cooperates in tracing it if logs are traced to him
3) Show a relaying log: a user wants to trace the initial
node
An article is relayed by node to node, and hence a tree is
constructed by gathering relaying logs. Now we suppose each
node relays an article to n nodes respectively. In that case, a
tree of relaying logs is an n-ary tree like Figure 7.
Let Nd to be a node whose depth from the root is d, and
T (Nd) to be the probability that relaying logs are traced to Nd.
Relaying logs are traced to Nd when either of the following
cases occurs.
1) At least one child node of Nd takes the action of
showing a relaying log
2) Relaying logs are traced to at least one child node
of Nd and the child node takes the action of not
showing a relaying log until traced to him
Let x to be the probability that a user does not show a
relaying log and y to be the probability that a user does not
show a relaying log until traced to him, where 0  x; y and
0  x+ y  1. The probability that a user shows a relaying log
is 1   (x + y). T (Nd) is described as follows.
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Let h to be the height of a tree, and a leaf node is
represented as Nh. The probability that relaying logs are traced
to a leaf node is defined as T (Nh) = 0. T (Nh 1), T (Nh 2), ...,
T (Nh m) are determined as follows.
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Fig. 8. A plot of T (N0).
= 1   (x + y(x + y)n)n
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(1  m  h)
An initial node is represented as N0, and hence the prob-
ability that relaying logs are traced to an initial node, that is,
T (N0) is determined as follows.
T (N0) = 1   (x + y(x + y(:::(x + y )n:::)n)n)n|    {z    }
h
Figure 8 shows a plot of T (N0) for each y, where n = 3 and
h = 10. The vertical axis represents T (N0) and the horizontal
one represents x. T (N0) is a monotone decreasing function of
x and y. It indicates that the more users take actions of not
showing a relaying log or not showing a relaying log until
traced to him, the more dicult it is to trace the initial node
of an article. Conversely, it is easier to trace the initial node
if more users show relaying logs.
B. Government Intervention
The purpose of the proposed system is to provide users with
opportunity of free expression. However, if unfavorable articles
for a government spread over the system, the government may
intervene in the system to suppress the spread of the articles
or trace the publishers of them. This section discusses attack
to break the availability and pseudonymity of the system by a
government.
1) Attack to Availability: A government may attack the
system to suppress the spread of unfavorable articles. Several
methods to attack the availability of the system are conceiv-
able.
Attack to the network
A government can make a system stop by attacking
SPOF if the system contains it. The proposed system
is designed as a distributed system not containing
any SPOF, and hence articles continue spreading
even if some nodes in the system stop. The network
of the system may become partially disconnected
when some nodes suddenly go down. However, the
system does not required to be a fully connected
network at all times since a node can relay articles
to another node as long as they are alive.
Attack to PKI
The proposed system requires users to have their
own certificates. Users cannot join in the system if
a government attacks the PKI used in the system and
stops it. As explained in Section II-B, the proposed
system adopts PGP Web of Trust for publishing
certificates. PGP Web of Trust does not require a
central CA, and hence it is dicult to stop it.
Deploying many nodes to impede the spread of articles
If there are nodes that do not relay an article, the
spread of the article is impeded. A government can
deploy many nodes that do not relay articles into the
network. However, users in the system can choose
nodes to peer with, and even if some nodes stop
relaying, an article can spread from other nodes
which have it. It is dicult to completely stop the
spread of an article by this method.
2) Attack to Pseudonymity: The proposed system allows
a user to publish an article pseudonymously. This section
discusses attack to the pseudonymity.
Deploying many nodes to trace the publisher
In the system, a user traces the initial node of an
article by tracing relaying logs. A government can
trace the initial node more easily by deploying nodes
near the initial node. In order to facilitate tracing
arbitrary nodes, a government can deploy many
nodes into the network and shorten the distances
from other nodes. Users in the system have their
own certificates and can choose nodes to peer with,
and hence they should not peer with nodes which
seem to be spies of a government.
Enforcing showing relaying logs
In order to trace the initial node of an article,
a government may enforce showing relaying logs
on users. In that case, most users would show
their relaying logs. However, government’s authority
generally aects only people within the borders
of the nation and not aects foreign nations. In
order to investigate a foreign user, a government
needs consensus with the government of the country
on investigating. Governments would cooperate in
investigating users if serious articles such as a plan
of terrorism had published, but investigation of criti-
cisms to a government could not get consensus with
other governments. Thus traceability of cross-border
cases is aected by consensus among governments,
so eliminating authoritarian censorship by a single
government, which is one of the purposes of the
proposed system, will be achieved. Users therefore
should peer with nodes in foreign countries as much
as possible, referring to their certificates.
V. Conclusion
This paper has proposed a P2P article distribution system
considering both users’ privacy and criminal investigation. In
the system, if many users prioritize privacy, their anonymity is
protected, but if many users prioritize criminal investigation,
they can trace the publisher of an article. In order to realize
that, each node in the system records a relaying log in its local
storage when it relays an article. In evaluation, traceability and
cases of government intervention have been discussed.
There are several issues for future work. (1) We should
examine the proposed system on a large scale environment.
(2) The proposed system needs a function to recommend nodes
to peer with to a user. (3) We should consider enhancing
the reliability of a certificate. (4) The eciency of article
distribution should be improved.
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